Introduction
The idea and practice of European citizenship is relevant in two main ways to the recent controversy in Germany over plans by the governing SocialDemocratic Party to reform citizenship law. One of these is that the concepts of citizenship and nationality continue to be thought of as synonymous in Germany but are now relatively distinct, both linguistically and politically, in several other national regimes and in the European Union (EU). Secondly, on the one hand, new German provisions will be more similar than before to the nationality laws of other member states by introducing a right [as opposed to a discretionary possibility] to citizenship through residence and legal naturalization, as well as ancestry. But, on the other, the decision on 16 March 1999 to abandon the possibility of dualcitizenship [or, in my language, nationality] means that, in this respect, the German approach to citizenship now runs counter to suggestions made by some specialists about the EU as a site of democratic practice.
This paper will open with a brief discussion of the distinctiveness of citizenship and nationality. This is necessary so that one can understand the following section outlining EU provisions. In conclusion, this paper will discuss some of the arguments about the prospects for EU citizenship, with special reference to loosening the overlap between the legal label of national identity and the normative practice of citizenship. 4
Citizenship and Nationality
As I have suggested elsewhere 1 , there are good grounds for treating the overlap of citizenship and nationality as a matter of historical contingency and not as an analytically necessary connection. In short, nationality is a legal identity from which no rights need arise, though obligations mightas is obvious when nationals are called 'subjects'. Conversely, citizenship is a practice, or a form of belonging, resting on a set of legal, social and participatory entitlements which may be conferred, and sometimes are, irrespective of nationality-or denied, as in the case of women and some religious and ethnic minorities, regardless of nationality.
While borders had been porous in the Middle and Late-Middle Ages and migration normal, the strategic interests of new states lay in impregnability and control of persons with or without leave to cross frontiers. Nationality was an obvious criterion and proof of nationality a simple method of verification. The process of modernization in the new states went hand in hand with the construction of the nation. This served external and internal purposes. It created a sense of the 'Otherness' of those who were a threat to the strategic interests of political elites. And it fostered the loyalty or allegiance that induced willingness to be taxed to fund the defense of the state and to be enlisted into military service. Since 1945, allegiance is relevant less to military purposes than to the legitimacy of redistribution and the funding of welfare systems.
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The construction of the nation was promoted through the dismantling of feudal bonds and their replacement by a gradual extension of legal and political rights. So complete became the overlap between national identity and citizenship status that, in many political systems, even those with separate words, 'citizenship' and 'nationality' became interchangeable. And, according to Raymond Aron, it was a contradiction in terms to see 5 citizenship rights as capable of being guaranteed by anything other than the state, more particularly the nation-state, and certainly not by a regime-the EU-that was not a state at all.
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But, using 'citizenship' as a synonym for 'nationality' can result in peculiar distortions of meaning. In late 19th century America, the Supreme Court ruled that a woman was, indeed, an American citizen but that being a citizen did not necessarily carry the right to vote. This empties the classical conception of 'citizen' of part of its core meaning and the ruling makes conceptual sense only if we substitute 'national' for 'citizen'. In other systems, both terms are employed in legislation but as though 'nationality and citizenship' were all one word in which the first and last components were interchangeable. For example, except for one Article of the 1922 Constitution, it was not until 1962 that Irish official documents began to be clear that there was a difference between citizenship as nationality and citizenship as the capacity to exercise rights. The current British passport still says 'Nationality: British citizen'.
However, from a longer historical perspective, we can see that citizenship is not the same as nationality but is about enabling people to participate in creating, maintaining and enjoying the good society, whether the people belonging to a society inhabit a citadel, a city-state, a locality, an empire, the world-and since John Stuart Mill and especially in Germany, the work-place. In the young United States of America, a century before the ruling just mentioned, and at the time of the making of the Constitution, there was no sense of an overarching American national identity and this did not evolve for a very long time. 
Rights Prior to Amsterdam
The Maastricht Treaty went some way to acknowledging criticism that the EU did not recognize people as citizens because they were human beings but only as workers or providers of services who needed not to lose rights when Framework, protects pregnant women workers and guarantees levels of maternity pay and leave. Three others in the 1990s, arising from agreements concluded through 'social dialogue', cover parental leave and leave for family reasons, the burden of proof in cases of discrimination, and part-time work.
Rights not based on the non-discrimination principle include: Directives in the 1980s on consultation over redundancy plans and protection of employment conditions when business is transferred to another undertaking; and others, stemming from the Single European Act of 1987, requiring consultation and protection in situations of risk and hazard at work. The latter, and others relating to the young and elderly, were introduced through the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. Under the auspices of Social Dialogue and the Maastricht Treaty, further steps have been, or are being, taken with respect to working conditions [eg, working hours, part-time contracts] and workers' rights of consultation in transnational companies, though the latter fall short of the high standards set 9 by the German co-determination model 6 . These areas are also covered by the Amsterdam Treaty.
The Treaty of Amsterdam
The Treaty of Amsterdam does little to enhance transnational or supranational political rights. But is does contain a number of provisions relating to human rights and it reflects a growing realization amongst governments, particularly those recently holding the EU presidency, that the policy concerns of citizens need to be more systematically addressed. developments that the previous government had secured in the Maastricht Treaty, thus enabling social policy to be brought into the main body of the Amsterdam Treaty. Secondly, the government has introduced legislation to incorporate the ECHR into domestic law-welcomed as a 'step in the right direction', though also criticized for its limitations.
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The concrete provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty designed to buttress the principles noted above do not extend Maastricht's primary political rights to General Elections. But the Treaty does introduce new legal and secondary political rights which could, depending on implementation, become significant. the Common Travel Area between it and the UK but made its distinctive position clear in the wording of the Protocols.
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Despite controversy prior to agreement over [un]employment and poverty, the Amsterdam Treaty extends its scope for action in the socio-economic sphere into two new chapters. One on employment does not intend to expand citizens' rights but aims to coordinate national policies, under EU guidance and monitoring, so as to achieve 'a high level of employment' and 'a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce'. 18 Rights at work, excluding pay and industrial disputes but including consultation over proposals with the 'social partners', are part of the subject of the chapter on social policy. This promises further directives to improve consultation, to reduce exclusion from the labour market [and, therefore, one source of poverty] and to make sex equality more real. In response to an unfavorable ruling on positive action in the ECJ (Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, ECJ [1995] Case C-450/93), the chapter explicitly authorizes measures 'to make it easier for the underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers'. Action is promisedthough mostly subject unanimous voting-on social security, conditions when contracts are terminated, worker participation in company policy, employment conditions for 'third country' nationals, and job creation.
Other conditions which affect the lives of citizens are also covered. Proposed actions include: harmonized and national measures to reduce environmental risks in general and at work, including impact assessments of all policies; the overcoming of major health scourges and attention to the health implications of all other policies; and consumer protection.
Assessments of EU Citizenship and its Prospects
Assessments of EU citizenship and its prospects are contradictory, possibly being determined by divergent general ideological and epistemological 
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outlooks. Sometimes, they seem guided by whether the commentator favors or opposes European integration (Meehan, 1996) . Sometimes, they seem to depend on whether the analyst is a positivist who examines only what exists concretely and compares its slightness to national provisions-but overlooking the contrast between decades and centuries of evolution in the EU and national systems respectively (Meehan, 1993) . Conversely, other analysts suggest that what is important is not the size but the dynamics of change; that is, the fact that established norms have been breached at all opens the possibility, though not the inevitability, of new paradigms.
The oldest criticism of EU citizenship starts from the limitations of the Treaty of Rome as a basis for rights. These being restricted to the freedom of movement of goods, capital, labor and services mean that European rights were restricted to the 'citizen-as-worker' instead of reflecting the normative principle that people are citizens because they are human beings. This makes it particularly defective for women and all those not in regular, conventional employment. Also, although ECJ jurisprudence tended to expand the scope of rights and to limit anomalies within and across states, at least until the 1980s, the legal instruments and enforcement procedures can make it difficult to realize rights that are, in practice, common across the Community. It is also argued that the evolution of European citizenship replicates in a larger arena the physical and social exclusion of people without the right nationality.
['Third country' migrants within the Community, however, do have some protection under the original Treaty of Rome, if they are members of a migrant EU family or as a result of agreements between the Community and third countries.]
Concerns about the narrowness of rights began to be acknowledged in the mid-1970s, grew with the momentum of discussion of an 'ever closer union' in the 1980s, and were reflected in the Maastricht Treaty. Though there are positive assessments of Maastricht and prior developments, the 1991 Treaty has been criticized for not going far enough.
All critics note that the status and, hence, rights of EU citizens continue to rest upon nationality of a member state and that this remains a prerogative of member state governments-though recently, the UK government was taken Maastricht also stress the limitations of local partnership, regional subsidiarity and the status, powers and budget of the Committee of the Regions. Such criticisms would need to be met if the Amsterdam Treaty is, indeed, to live up to its promise outlined by Jacques Santer.
So far there has been a cautious welcome for the Amsterdam Treaty. Positive views (eg, Oreja, 18.6.97; IEA, 24.6.97) have been expressed about: the adoption of strong normative principles of rights; the new basis for combatting more forms of discrimination; the procedures for dealing with infringements of rights; the inclusion of the Employment Chapter; the references to reducing exclusion; and the proposal to set standards for 'third country' nationals at work and in free movement. The Treaty's references to national and Union representative bodies goes a little way towards Chryssochoou's insistence that 'democratic deficits' need to be addressed on both planes if the experience of citizenship is to be realized in full. 25 On the other hand, the Commission itself reflects some of the concerns of voluntary organisations by regretting the limitations of social policy. It also notes that 'the institutional system is not yet entirely equal to the challenges' and regrets the opaqueness of the Treaty's text (Oreja, 18.6.97 His argument rests on a critique of the case that a shared national identity is a pre-condition for citizenship. For, by insisting that citizenship can be built only on such bonds, such theories propose that a democratic practice be based on a commonality that was formed under pre-democratic conditions. In contrast, a site of democratic citizenship is one in which people live together under a set of principled bonds, such as those identified by Robert Dahl as voting equality, effective participation, enlightened understanding, control of agendas and inclusiveness. In drawing this contrast, Closa suggests that supranational citizenship is less vulnerable than national citizenship to charges of exclusion and discrimination because, being unable to draw on comparable non-principled bonds, its success must depend on democratic and human rights norms.
Dahl, of course, is a citizen of that country which I mentioned earlier where democratic norms and ties [albeit defective] preceded national bonding. In contrast, Britishness was forged by elites, prior to democracy, to make bonds between peoples who had been enemies of one another. It worked for some centuries, in the context of different sub-state national identities, as principled bonds were grafted on to the pre-democratic unifications. But the fragility of the origins is re-emerging and there are claims, at least in Scotland, and to some extent, Wales, which support Closa's case; that is, that, from a democratic basis, a new union of principled norms can be negotiated at the supranational level-the EU. Closa is guarded about whether there is a strong enough civil society in the EU to transcend the defects of national citizenship in order to bring about the benefits of a regime based on principled bonds-without a willingness on the part of states themselves to agree to stop trying to maintain the impression that anxieties about national identities are well attended to in EU provisions. The changes which he suggests are necessary and include the avoidance of derogations and exemptions which 'offer shelter to communitarian understandings of the relationship between individuals and the state premissed on nationality'; 'the full constitutionalization of a European political status'; greater opportunities for direct citizenship participation in EU affairs; stronger commonality and reciprocity of rights in different member states; and willingness by states to respond to 'spill-over' pressures from EU citizenship status on to varying nationality laws, including greater willingness to acknowledge dual or multi-nationality. 30 Something of the last is beginning to happen. Some 'spill-over' can be seen in Germany's intention to proceed with allowing citizenship through naturalization as well as ancestry, if not in its abandonment of making dual-citizenship legal. The ECJ is playing a role. The UK and Gibraltarians was mentioned above. Another case was about a person with dual-nationality-of a member state and a third country. The ECJ rejected another member state's claim to be free to recognise only the third country dimension and, hence, to deny rights.
If Closa is right about the weakness of European civil society, as a whole, in combatting a privatized, liberal or libertarian conception of citizenship, then enlargement may reinforce the challenge. The prospective member states, while having to subscribe to principles of liberty, democracy and human rights as a condition of entry are not well placed to do so in practiceemerging as they are from totalitarianism which suppressed civil society or bent it to the will of the state. At a conference during the 1998 UK presidency, harrowing tales were told of the vulnerability of emergent civil society associations in the Balkans and of discrimination against minorities in east and east-central Europe. With or without minority problems, the concept of liberty-perhaps necessitated by dire economic conditions-is, even more libertarian than that which Closa sees in the EU. It is the negative one of 'freedom from' restraint-not the 'freedom to' which is implicit in Christianand social-democracy and still has some place in the link in the EU model between social inclusion and economic progress. The point to be drawn here is not about the addition of more nationalities, either per se or in their further reduction of the overlap between nationality and citizenship. It is that growing mismatches amongst sets of principled bonds, not a more complex collection of pre-democratic identifications, may inhibit the transformation of EU citizenship along the lines aspired to by Closa.
